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Since antiquity, grateful rulers have acknowledged meritorious service of
members of their military by awarding them pensions for their efforts.
Today, the term “pension” generally refers to cash payments received after
the termination of one’s working years either in the form of an annuity
or in a lump sum. Historically, a much wider range of retiree beneWts, sur-
vivor’s annuities, and disability beneWts were also referred to as pensions.
In the United States, for example, both the early army and navy pension sys-
tems were primarily disability plans. However, disability was often deWned
to include superannuation or the inability to perform regular duties due
to inWrmities associated with old age. Over time, the pension plans were ex-
panded to support dependents of deceased veterans and to provide old-age
beneWts to all qualiWed retirees. In fact, every disability plan for U.S. veter-
ans eventually became an old-age pension. Thus, these early pension plans
were given the responsibility for providing the same range of beneWts as the
modern U.S. Social Security system, though of course, the size of today’s
Social Security system far exceeds that of the early military pension plans.
As part of their compensation, both naval and army personnel through-
out the Western world have been eligible for some type of pension bene-
Wts since at least the eighteenth century. Generally speaking, pensions for
military personnel were well established prior to the development of pen-
sions for other public sector workers. Military pensions also antedated
pensions for workers in the private sector. Interestingly, the history of pen-
sion coverage in developing countries in the twentieth century also follows
this basic pattern. National governments Wrst provide pensions to their mil-
itary personnel and government workers and then pensions are extended
to urban employees. The expansion of coverage to self-employed individu-
als, the agricultural labor force, and other rural workers typically comes
much later (World Bank 1994; U.S. Social Security Administration 1999).
This chapter provides a brief history of military pensions before 1800,
offering a few examples of the coverage and types of pensions available to
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the veterans of the military forces throughout the history of the West. It is
not intended to be exhaustive, but rather the objective is to give the reader
a feel for the antecedents of subsequent public sector pensions in the
United States. A number of economic and historical connections emerge.
Roman Military Pensions 
In the classical world, the military pension typically took the form of a land
grant or a special, often semi-public, appointment. These pensions were
not necessarily associated with superannuation, but rather were bestowed
upon veterans of particular legions after one or more speciWc (and usually
successful) campaigns, and commanders who possessed military skill or
political power or, as was usually the case, both could also a expect a pen-
sion. The military campaigns in the classical world were often long-term
affairs, lasting until one side in the conXict gradually wore down the resis-
tance of their adversaries. For example, Rome conducted three separate
campaigns on its eastern frontiers against Mithridates (VI) of Pontus,
and collectively these campaigns lasted nearly 20 years (c. 89–65 b.c.). In
the west, it took Julius Caesar and his legions eight years to subdue Gaul
(58–51 b.c.). 
Obtaining and maintaining the loyalty of proven veterans, such as Caesar’s
legionnaires, upon their return to Rome was one of the primary political
concerns of the leaders of the Roman republic, and the issue proved to be
a persistent one during the republic’s decline and the establishment of
the empire. The veterans, brutalized by the rigors of slaughtering their fel-
low men in face-to-face combat, often returned with few economic pros-
pects beyond the legion. The frequent realization that their colleagues in
Rome had prospered while they themselves had sacriWced their youth for
the gloriWcation of Rome left them embittered and susceptible to dema-
goguery. Their predicament was captured poignantly in the lamentations of
Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus. The republic would pay for its neglect of
this issue.
In 123 b.c., the tribune Gaius Gracchus proposed, among other reforms,
to found trading colonies at Capua, Carthage, and Tarentum to provide
sinecures for veterans of recent campaigns. Perhaps not coincidentally,
those outposts were far enough from Rome itself that the veterans who
accepted would Wnd it hard to play any active role in Roman politics. It was
perhaps even less surprising that Gracchus’s enemies, who no doubt would
have been all too eager to employ those veterans against the tribune, made
much of that fact, and, after considerable civil unrest surrounding the pro-
posal, Gracchus and many of his supporters were slain. The signiWcance of
this action was not lost on subsequent Roman leaders. A generation later,
after defeating the Teutons and the Cimbri (102–101 b.c.), the general and
consul Gaius Marius (uncle of Julius Caesar) oversaw legislation granting
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estates to his loyal veterans. These estates were initially in Africa and later
Gaul. The distance from Rome of these land grants is again noteworthy.
After the Gallic estates were awarded to the soldiers, Marius’s veterans
were appeased and did not succumb to the temptations that plagued
Gracchus’s enemies. Despite the example set by the molliWcation of Marius’s
troops, the republic subsequently underwent sixty years of turmoil, among
which the Catiline Conspiracy (63–62 b.c.) proved particularly edifying. Its
collapse led to the formation of the First Triumvirate, a great nail in the
republic’s cofWn.
While the events leading to the republic’s eventual death defy concise
description, the turmoil ultimately resulted in the establishment of the
empire under Augustus (formerly Gaius Octavius). Being both a success-
ful soldier and a savvy politician, Augustus recognized that the ad hoc
nature of military pensions had been a source of some contention during
the last stages of the republic, and he wisely sought to end the mischief
associated with the granting of military pensions on a case-by-case basis. He
did so by simultaneously creating a pension system and by funding it
through the muniWcence of the state. Together, these reforms ensured that
warriors had a vested interest in the perpetuation of the system and the
state that funded it. This objective was shrewdly recognized and succinctly
explained nearly two thousand years ago by Suetonius in his Lives of the
Twelve Caesars :
Moreover, all the soldiers that were in any place whatsoever, [Augustus] tied to a cer-
tain prescript form and proportion of wages and rewards, setting down according
to the degree and place of every one, both their times of warfare, and also the com-
modities they should receive after the term of their service expired and their lawful
discharge: lest that by occasion of old age or for want they should, after they were
freed from warfare, be solicited to sedition and rebellion. (Suetonius Tranquillus,
trans. 1965) 
So in 13 b.c. Augustus created a pension plan in which veteran legion-
naires were to receive a pension upon the completion of 16 years in a legion
and four years in the military reserves. This was a true retirement plan,
designed to reward and mollify veterans returning from Rome’s frontier
campaigns. The original Augustan pension suffered from the fact that it
was paid from general revenues (and Augustus’s own generous contribu-
tions), and in a.d. 5 (a.d. 6 according to some sources), Augustus estab-
lished a special fund (aeririum militare) from which retiring soldiers were
paid. Although the length of service was also increased from 16 years on
active duty to 20 and Wve years in the reserves, the pension system was
explicitly funded through a 5 percent tax on inheritances and a one percent
tax on all transactions conducted through auctions. Retiring legionnaires
were to receive 3,000 denarii in a lump sum and centurions received con-
siderably larger stipends.
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At the time, 3,000 denarii represented a decent amount. In fact it was
13 times a legionnaires’ annual salary. Even after the devaluation of the
Roman coinage during the Wrst century a.d., at the interest rates of the time
viewed as an annuity, a legionnaire’s pension would have equaled 30 ounces
of silver a year—a substantial amount by the standards of a working-class
Roman (Homer and Sylla 1991). The purchasing power of this pension
can be gauged in several ways. For example, a single denarius equaled
roughly a day’s wage for a laborer during the Wrst century a.d.; so at an 8
percent discount rate, the pension would have yielded roughly 75 percent
of a laborer’s annual earnings. Another way to look at the pension would
be in terms of purchasing power. The Book of Matthew states that Judas
betrayed Jesus for 30 pieces of silver—symbolically, the price of slave. If
these coins were shekels, as some scholars suspect, then that would have
equaled 15 ounces of silver or roughly the price of a slave; hence a legion-
naire’s annual pension (30 ounces of silver) would have yielded an annual
income roughly equal to 200 percent of the price of a slave.
Despite the improvements to the administration of the empire that the
pension system offered, the Caesars still hedged their bets in many cases
by supplementing these pensions with land grants, often far from Rome,
and other emoluments (Crook 1996). Gibbon noted the importance of
the Augustan pension reform in its totality. Remarking on both the mone-
tary and in-kind retirement beneWts, he claimed that “after the legions were
rendered permanent by the emperors, the provinces were peopled by a race
of soldiers; and the veterans, whether they received the reward of their ser-
vice in land or in money, usually settled with their families in the country,
where they had honourably spent their youth” (Gibbon 1776, 1: chap. 11).
Although the empire faced much turmoil after the reign of Augustus, the
troubles associated with the military pensions during the late republic were
largely absent from the Pax Romana. Most importantly for the purposes
of this study, the Roman pension system established by Augustus illustrates
the use of a dedicated tax stream to support an ongoing pension system.
The experience of the system also offers an example of how a government
adjusted the terms of its pension plan to Wt changing economic and politi-
cal circumstances.
Pensions in the Age of Feudalism
In the centuries after Rome’s decline in the West the nature of military
service became organized around the feudal system that emerged among
the kingdoms and Wefdoms founded on Rome’s remains. Feudalism was not
conducive to a formal pension system of the type instituted by Augustus,
which has reemerged in modern times; the military pension system estab-
lished in Rome ultimately collapsed with the empire, and the system was
superseded by another form of compensation. In its simplest and idealized
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form, the medieval military system consisted of a hierarchy in which a
member of the nobility owed personal allegiance to a more powerful ruler
or liege. Power in this context was nominally political and often ecclesias-
tical, but in practice it was military power that mattered. This allegiance
was primarily manifested in the readiness to supply manpower, in the form
of the noble and his vassals, when the noble’s liege went to war. In return,
the noble was exempt from more plebeian forms of taxation and typically
was entitled to rule, though not necessarily own in the sense the word is
used today, a feud. A feud was literally a landed estate held in trust on the
condition of the provision of the aforementioned military service. 
The rents from this feud, any villeinage or labor dues associated with it,
and certain monopoly privileges concerning the regulation of trade, the
administration of justice, coining of money, and so forth accrued to the
ruling noble.1 Thus in the Middle Ages, the acquisition of a feud provided,
at least in theory, a lifetime income in the form of the stream of payments
the ruler could extract from his monopoly priviliges. Particularly worthy
knights might aspire to receive more prosperous feuds and/or lofty titles
should their liege be successful in conquest, but the greater concern was the
loss of the feud in the case of failure. Thus, from an economic perspective,
the medieval feud was analogous to a life annuity, the control of which was
based on loyal, if not successful, military service. In essence the Xow of
income from this annuity was derived entirely from the privilege of ruling
a geographical territory. Although the territory might contain certain com-
mercial activities, such as a Xour mill or cider press, the annuity itself was
derived from the land, and so perpetuated the association between aris-
tocracy and land tenure. 
In such an economic and political system, retirement, as we know it today,
accompanied by a formal pension would have made little sense. The system
was perpetuated by the very absence of the well-deWned political units with
large tax bases that marked Rome before the feudal age and the nation state
after it. Each ruler extracted his own income stream from the territory he
ruled. If in old age he should decide to reduce his administrative and mili-
tary burdens, then he could do so, but he always ran the risk of being
replaced by a rival. The expansion of the tax base made possible by the
reemergence of large-scale trading networks after the eleventh century
accompanied by scale economies in conquest and administration led to the
eventual reconsolidation of the medieval Wefs into larger political units,
and ultimately, the system was supplanted altogether by a more efWcient
organization—the nation state.
National Military Pensions 
Feudalism proved to be an inferior form of economic and political organi-
zation, and it was unable to compete with the national states that were
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eventually formed throughout Europe. The establishment of the nation
state led to the reemergence of standing armies. Like the Roman legions,
these armies owed their allegiance to a state rather than to a person. The
establishment of standardized systems of military pensions followed very
shortly thereafter, beginning as early as the sixteenth century in England.
During its 1592–93 session, Parliament established “reliefe for Souldiours
[who] adventured their lives and lost their limbs or disabled their bodies”
in the service of the Crown. Annual pensions were not to exceed 10 pounds
(roughly 50 gold dollars at subsequent exchange rates) for “private sol-
diers” or 20 pounds for a “lieutenant.”2 Initially, funds to support pension
payments to the English military were raised from taxes levied on inhabi-
tants of the locale from which the soldier was impressed or in which he was
born. Over the course of the seventeenth century, pensions increasingly
were paid from general revenues of the national government.
The Glorious Revolution (1689), which in matters of public Wnance
established the primacy of Parliament relative to the crown, fundamentally
altered the administration of the English, and subsequently British, army.
Among other things, it explicitly made the Wnancing of the army a prerog-
ative of Parliament, and among the speciWc reforms that followed was the
establishment in 1692 of a soldiers’ home, Chelsea Hospital, for disabled
noncommissioned ofWcers and men. The facility did not generally accom-
modate all the eligible soldiers, and in the eighteenth century Parliament
authorized stipends, essentially pensions, in lieu of residence at the hospi-
tal. The term “hospital” is slightly misleading. Prior to the establishment
of the germ theory of disease in the nineteenth century, hospitals were
little more than homes for the sick, elderly, disabled, and dying. In practice,
Chelsea was just a retirement home for old soldiers. Chelsea’s expenditures
were Wnanced through mandatory deductions from soldiers’ pay and sup-
plemented, when necessary, from the general funds of the Exchequer.
Shortly after Chelsea was founded, a similar “hospital” was established for
disabled seamen. Supposedly, Queen Mary, touched by the pathetic state of
some injured seamen she encountered, directed that something be done for
them and their colleagues. In 1694 she and her husband, formerly William
of Orange, now King William, granted for a seamen’s hospital a palace
under construction at Greenwich and the surrounding grounds. The famous
architect, Christopher Wren, supplied the plans gratis. In addition to the prop-
erty, the royal family dedicated £2,000 per annum for the hospital’s upkeep.
Seamen were also taxed 6 pence per month. These monies proved inade-
quate, and in 1707 they were supplemented with all forfeited and unclaimed
prize monies and a percentage of all other prize monies (Clowes 1898).
The reform of the British pension system following the Glorious Revo-
lution coincided with King William’s War. This military action might
be more informatively entitled “King William’s War Fought with Parlia-
ment’s Money.” Henceforth, English military actions may have employed
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His Majesty’s ofWcers, but the soldiers were paid with the taxes of His
Majesty’s subjects—taxes that had to be approved and allocated by
Parliament. Even as Parliament undertook control of the Wnancing of mili-
tary affairs, it began to formalize military pensions. OfWcers who were
retired for old age or inWrmity or who were otherwise disbanded were taken
off activity duty and granted half-pay for life, while, nominally at least,
remaining subject to recall at any time. It is interesting to note that the most
prominent private corporation in Britain, the East India Company, adopted
the same pension plan for its soldiers (Philips 1961). Like the current
Federal Reserve system in the United States and other federally chartered
corporations, the East India Company was a private corporation with pub-
lic responsibilities. While it was Wrst and foremost chartered as a limited
liability trading company, to discharge the terms of its charter it subse-
quently became associated with a set of other activities designed to facilitate
trade. For example, it essentially served as the military, police, and customs
service for the British states in India.
A similar plan was created for the British naval personnel. Inactive or
retired ofWcers received half-pay as long as they refrained from accepting
other public sector employment. It should be noted that, at least with
respect to the navy, half-pay did not necessarily mean exactly 50 percent
of an ofWcer’s salary. There were often arcane adjustments that made the
actual pension payment roughly half-pay. A description of compensation,
including pensions, in the eighteenth-century Royal Navy can be found
in Pope (1981). Often this ofWcial pension was supplemented with extra-
ordinary payments, and in some cases these were enormous. The Lords
St. Vincent, Duncan, and Nelson each received £3,000 (roughly $15,000)
a year. This was an enormous sum for the time, but these very generous
pensions to popular military heroes were clearly exceptions to the general
pension policy of the day. Warrant ofWcers (e.g., boatswains, carpenters,
and gunners) had to serve 15 years in the service to qualify for a pension.
Masters and surgeons had to have eight years at sea to qualify. These pen-
sions for noncommissioned ofWcers were not entitlements, and the individ-
ual had to be “incapable” of continuing in the service, as determined by
naval physicians, before receiving payments. In other words, these were
essentially retirement pensions, though one had to be certiWed as inWrm. As
for disability pensions, an ofWcer who was disabled in action received a
bounty of one year’s pay and medical expenses, as did his widow or mother,
should she be widowed, in case his wounds resulted in death. Noncom-
missioned ofWcers and seamen disabled in action received a stipend from
the navy’s “Chatham Chest.” The Chest was a contributory pension plan that
was funded by deductions from the seamen’s pay and to which, ofWcially,
the Admiralty gave nothing.
The adoption of the British ofWcer’s pensions of the eighteenth century
illustrated two aspects of pension plans as part of an organization’s human
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resource policy. The Wrst objective was the desire to provide adequate
income for those unable to continue in the service. The second objective
was obtained when the pension was tied to a policy of mandatory retire-
ment. In this case, the pension plan provided a useful method of forcing
unwanted or unneeded older persons from the labor force. The eighteenth-
century British pension plan required senior ofWcers to leave rather lucra-
tive positions in exchange for receiving the pension. In some instances, the
pension served as a reward to those who were inclined to leave the service,
but in other instances the British government used the pension in conjunc-
tion with mandatory retirement to force military personnel to leave active
duty. This did not always sit well with the ofWcers, who preferred to remain
on the job at full pay or, as some might say, retire on the job at full pay. This
relationship between pension coverage and forced retirement reappeared
as part of pension systems from time to time over the next century and
became particularly important in U.S. military pensions in the nineteenth
century and private pension plans in the middle of the twentieth century.
Of course the half-pay system did not always sit well with the public either.
Since, seniority aside, the least effective ofWcers would be the ones most
likely to be pensioned, one could view the pension as a textbook case of
moral hazard. Samuel Johnson certainly did. He described a public sector
pension as “generally understood to mean pay given to a state-hireling for
treason to his country” (quoted in Higgs 1926, 88–89). Apparently, Parlia-
ment considered half-pay for treason better than full pay.
Britain’s colonies in America also created pensions for members of their
colonial militia. As early as 1624, the general assembly of the Virginia Com-
pany enacted laws providing for disability payments to individuals hurt in
the service of the colony; however, this act did not receive the necessary rati-
Wcation of the parent company in England. The Wrst formal pension plan
in America was established in 1636 by the Plymouth Colony. The general
assembly of the Virginia Company followed by approving a resolution in
October 1644:
Whereas in the late expeditions against the Indians, diverse men were hurt and
maymed and disabled from provideing for their necessary maintenance and subsis-
tance, Be it therefore enacted by the authority of this present Grand Assembly, That
all hurt or maymed men be releived and provided for by the severall counties, where
such men reside or inhabit. (Glasson 1918)
Other early plans were adopted by the Massachusetts Bay Colony and
Maryland in the 1670s and New York in the 1690s. Generally, colonial sol-
diers were entitled to a disability payment if “hurt or maymed” as a result
of their service. Typically, the colony disbursed the funds, but collected
them from the county in which the soldier was born, enlisted, or resided.
Although the colonies also provided beneWts for the widows and orphans of
slain soldiers, both those payments and the disability pensions were usually
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based on need and were proportional to the extent of disability. As noted
below, some of the colonial pension payments survived independence, the
Revolution, and the creation of a new nation, the United States.
The English and their American colonies were not alone among the Great
Powers in providing pensions for their soldiers during the early modern era.
Despite the conXict with the ofWcer corps over mandatory retirement, the Brit-
ish pension polices were quite liberal relative to their continental neighbors
and military competitors. Spain also maintained pensions for its imperial
forces. Both the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs could be quite generous
in their grants to favored warriors and conquerors. Until the seventeenth
century, these rewards often followed the form of the medieval land grant.
Even when cash or other forms of remuneration were granted, these beneWts
were still awarded on a case-by-case basis. To a certain extent, arbitrary re-
tirement rewards still existed in the eighteenth century. Among the most
striking examples of Habsburg beneWcence was the pension granted by Em-
peror Charles VI to the great Weld marshal Prince Eugene of Savoy.3 Upon
Eugene’s retirement in 1724, Charles granted the prince an annual pension
of 140,000 gulden (50,000 gold dollars) and a hunting estate at Sieben-
brunn in Lower Austria estimated to be worth twice that amount (McKay
1977). Also under the Habsburgs, the Spanish crown began systematically
Wnancing military pensions from its own, as opposed to state, revenues be-
ginning in 1613. It took nearly another 150 years, however, before the Span-
ish pension system was formalized as an obligation of the state in 1761 during
the reign of Carlos III. One of the more enlightened rulers of the day, Carlos
was by most accounts an able administrator and effective reformer. A scion
of the Spanish House of Bourbon, Carlos had begun similar reforms decades
earlier when he ruled Naples and Sicily as Charles IV (Chandler 1991).
Yet another rising European military power began offering a pension
plan in the eighteenth-century. Prior to the Seven Years War, Prussia’s
Frederick the Great, like his father, Frederick William, before him, offered
state pensions on an ad hoc basis. Perhaps reXecting Dr. Johnson’s senti-
ments, these pensions were not always welcomed by their recipients. There
is a famous story, repeated by Frederick’s biographer, that while accompa-
nying the army on an exhausting march to Kolin during the summer of
1757, a crucial time in the Seven Years War, Frederick came upon an aged
non-commissioned ofWcer and engaged the old warrior in the following
exchange (Asprey 1986, 128).
Frederick: “What’s wrong?”
Soldier: “The march is too much for me.”
Frederick: “How long have you served?”
Soldier: “Forty-Wve years, beginning under the King, your father.”
Frederick: “Right! If we get into winter quarters I’ll pension you.”
Soldier: “The worst disgrace possible. I’ll live and die a soldier.”
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By the war’s end, many soldiers were not so eager to die in uniform, and
Frederick subsequently established both disability and retirement pensions
for his ofWcers and men. Frederick created an old soldiers’ home in Berlin.
It was primarily for invalids, and like Chelsea hospital it was perpetually
without vacancy, holding no more than 600 veterans at a time. Those who
were disabled but not residing in the Berlin home were pensioned at the rate
of one thaler a month. At eighteenth-century exchange rates this amount
would have been roughly equivalent to 1.50 British pounds (or 7.50 gold
dollars) a year. To put these Wgures in perspective, the monthly pay of sea-
men in the British navy was only slightly below an annual Prussian pension.
Prussian veterans who were not disabled were not automatically entitled
to a pension but were offered special consideration for jobs in the civil ser-
vice or as school teachers. OfWcers below the rank of general were eligible
for both retirement and disability pensions, though these were not generous
by British standards, generally being only a few thalers ($2.00 to $3.00) a
month. Still, Frederick was quite generous with his generals, who received
100 or more thalers a month in addition to estates, senior civil service
appointments, and crown lands. It is worth emphasizing that the Prussian
military pension was not an entitlement in the sense that the British and
Spanish pensions were, and veterans of regiments that had less than stellar
reputations could, and often did, receive nothing (Asprey 1986). It was only
in subsequent decades that the Prussian pensions became a system on the
British model.
The early modern French pension system was in some ways the least
progressive of those offered by the Great Powers. Prior to the French
Revolution, under the ancien régime, the Bourbons, like their Habsburg
colleagues, were often generous to favorites. However, for those state
employees who did not win the king’s favor, the ministers who headed the
French departments of state had complete autonomy when it came to mat-
ters of compensation for those serving in their ministries. Hence, to obtain
a state pension, one had to be a loyal and valuable ministerial employee
and, perhaps more important, remain in the current minister’s favor at the
time of retirement. After the revolution, the Assembly abolished this prac-
tice in 1791 and began to regulate state pensions. However, the Wnancial
and political turmoil that the French state experienced over the subsequent
decade imposed a great deal of uncertainty on any Wnancial commitment
made by the various regimes that controlled Paris (Brown 1995). This was
particularly true with respect to disability and widow pensions, which, in
any case, were only passed into law in 1793 (Bertaud 1988). 
With the restoration of the monarchy, many ofWcers were retired; how-
ever, the court managed to honor in one form or another the service of
Napoleonic veterans. Still, during this period, the French military pension
system was woeful compared with those of the other Great Powers. For
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example by the 1820s, a Prussian captain earned twice as much as a French
captain on active duty, and depending on his regiment, a British captain
might earn three times that of his French counterpart. These differences
were magniWed by the “replacement rates” offered by their pensions. As
noted, British ofWcers received half-pay, or roughly half-pay, anyway; Prus-
sian Weld-grade ofWcers would expect to receive roughly 40 percent of
their base pay in retirement, but a French ofWcer would only receive
an annuity of about 25 percent of his much lower pay (Porch 1974). As a
result, given his higher salary and higher pension rate, a British ofWcer
might reasonably expect a pension that was Wve or six times larger than his
French counterpart.
Despite the wide variation in the level of pension beneWts paid to military
personnel of the early modern Great Powers, this brief review demonstrates
that by the early nineteenth century all the Powers had created some type
of formal pension system for their military forces. Of course, the reforms
in the Great Power military pensions were only a small part of the broader
changes associated with the rise of the nation state. By deWnition, the state
maintains a comparative advantage in violence, and as Augustus recognized
two millennia ago, the perpetuation of this advantage was closely tied to
the economics of military compensation, an important component of which
was the pension. Given these precedents, particularly those of the British,
it follows that the founders of the United States adopted a system of military
pensions before a United States had even been formally created. Before
turning to that history, it will be useful to review some fundamental differ-
ences between army and navy compensation, because the nature of subse-
quent pension plans reXected these differences.
Comparing Army and Navy Pension Plans
One of the most striking characteristics of the history of military pensions
in the United States is the difference between the early plans offered by
the army and those offered by the navy. In fact, coverage requirements and
beneWt formulas were not substantially different. What was radically differ-
ent between the two plans was the way in which the plans were funded. The
army pension plan was a pay-as-you-go pension system based on revenues
from the general fund of the federal government; while the navy plan was
funded by the prizes captured by naval personnel. This difference in fund-
ing is largely explained by the inherent difference imbedded in the eco-
nomic incentives and contracts between army and naval compensation.
Dating back at least a millennium, the compensation of Western naval
forces was typically secured from shares of the plunder they captured.
Interestingly, pirates, privateers (essentially licensed pirates), and regular
naval forces all adopted some variation of this compensation system.
Although the term privateer did not enter the lexicon until the seventeenth
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century, the practice, at least in the West, dates from 1070, when the king
of Denmark sold licenses sanctioning commerce raiding (Roesdahl 1998).4
This contract between sovereign and licensee offered something to both
parties. The king, exercising his privilege-granting monopoly enforced by
a comparative advantage in violence, received revenue (North 1981), while,
in return, the privateer essentially obtained a license to commit piracy. The
privateers and their crews, like pirates, were compensated in kind or
through the liquidation of their prizes. This form of compensation for
naval personnel survived the rise of the nation state and, indeed, in the
United States lasted through the American Civil War.
It would take several centuries after the Viking raids before the practice
of privateering was formally legitimized by modern nation states. English
monarchs, including King John in 1205 and Edward III in 1340, formally
sanctioned the awarding of prize money to privateers, but the golden age of
privateering began under the Tudors (Oliver 1946). The use of government-
sanctioned privateers accelerated in the spring of 1585, when the Spanish
government authorized the conWscation of a number of English ships docked
in Spanish harbors. The goods onboard were conWscated and the ships’
crews were imprisoned. Not surprisingly, English merchants sought relief
from their government, and in July 1585 the government authorized the
lord high admiral, Charles Howard, Baron of EfWngham, to issue letters of
reprisal to merchants who had been harmed by Spain’s seizure of their wares.5
These actions marked the beginning of the privateer as a primary instru-
ment of naval warfare, and the history of privateering weighed heavily on
the subsequent history of military pensions.
The process of appeal and issuance of the letter of reprisal was formally
conducted through the High Court of Admiralty. Because he exercised con-
trol of the appointments to the court, the lord admiral maintained effective
control of the process, and with good reason, since he alone ultimately
answered to the crown for all matters pertaining to prizes. It is important
to note that this particular aspect of the dispute between England and
Spain, a dispute of such economic, political, and religious complexity that
it deWes concise description, was addressed in prize courts rather than
through more formal military means. This is because at the time England
and Spain were not formally at war. Queen Elizabeth did not want to initi-
ate a war over what were in effect narrowly commercial issues, and she hes-
itated to respond by sending ships of the line to Iberia or invading Spanish
possessions with costly land forces. But for domestic political reasons she
could not easily do nothing. Thus, the letter of reprisal became, de facto,
an instrument of the undeclared war.
The letter of reprisal granted its holder the right to collect in kind, and
by force if necessary, the value of goods conWscated by those not otherwise
subject to the purview and restraints of domestic law enforcement. In prac-
tice, those who conWscated the goods were typically the agents of a foreign
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government. In contrast, those from whom relief was sought on the high
seas were merely merchantmen Xying the Xag of that government. In any
case, the letter of reprisal was a document that temporarily conferred on
the plaintiff the coercive powers of the state in order to settle what was
nominally a disagreement between private parties. However, nothing in the
letter prohibited its holder from combining or contracting with a third
party, and indeed the aggrieved merchants almost immediately did so. Com-
pelled by the logic of comparative advantage, they contracted with parties
experienced in using force on the high seas. Often these agents were little
more than pirates. Thus, the letter of reprisal essentially legalized piracy so
long as it was directed at the ships Xying the Xag of the state that initiated
aggression. 
The ships that were captured under a letter of reprisal were prizes.
Hence, they were subject to customs duties and an additional 10 percent
assessment, which funded the admiralty courts from which the letters were
issued and in which the prizes were adjudicated. In addition, the admiralty
courts eventually charged fees for the issuance of letters of reprisal. All this
meant that the government in general and the admiralty in particular had
a direct Wnancial interest in expanding the supply of licenses for privateer-
ing. Nominally, the letter of reprisal was issued to a speciWc individual to
rectify a speciWc wrong. In practice, however, the Wnancial interests of both
the crown and the admiralty as well as military expediency led to an expan-
sion of privateering. The privateers often dispensed with the aforemen-
tioned formalities and simply relied on the good will of the authorities when
prizes were brought to port. 
Ultimately, these practices were formalized in the letter of marque (liter-
ally, seizure by warrant), which was a more general warrant for commerce
raiding. The letter of marque represented the culmination of roughly six
centuries of evolution of Western law and the rise of the nation-state.
Indeed, just as the Danish king had exercised his royal prerogatives in the
eleventh century, Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution explicitly
reserves for Congress the right to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal.”
Privateering proved to be a fairly resilient institution. It survived until it
was banned by all the Great Powers, except the United States and Spain, in
the Declaration of Paris of 1856. The last state of any note actively to engage
in the practice was the Confederate States of America. For the purposes of
this discussion, the key features of the system of privateering were the share
arrangement by which the crews were compensated and the fact that priva-
teers were essentially free agents. The share system is interesting because it
is an arrangement that the U.S. navy ultimately adopted to fund its pension
plan. As free agents, the privateers were not subject to the normal forms
of military command and control under which regular naval forces oper-
ated. Both characteristics were based on the inability of naval leaders effec-
tively to monitor the daily activities of ships at sea, and these principles are
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closely related to the structure of military pensions in general and the navy
pension plan in particular.
An analysis of alternative market or decision-making systems helps ex-
plain why governments ultimately adopted prize shares as the system of
compensation for naval personnel. To see the importance of the share sys-
tem, compare the advantages of a pure market system in which all contracts
are between atomistic (free) agents with a system in which at least some of
decision making is centralized in an organization—such as a militray orga-
nization. In the context of military activities, in general, and those of the
navy in particular, the objectives of the state would be difWcult to achieve
using a pure market system based on individual contracts. Although naval
operations are by deWnition an activity of the state, naval objectives con-
ceivably could be carried out through a market system by subcontractors
rather than by military personnel. Indeed, privateers and their land war
equivalents, mercenaries, have long histories of being used by rulers to
support their objectives, and privateers fulWlled just such a role for many
governments until the mid-nineteenth century. However, during the early
modern era, privateers and mercenaries were gradually being replaced by
the uniformed forces of modern nation-states. To see why this transition
occurred, consider that one problem with relying on private contracting for
national defense is that in certain instances the cost of enforcing such con-
tracts can be prohibitive. Throughout history, governments that trusted
their defenses to mercenaries often found themselves renegotiating their
contracts at crucial points, frequently when the enemy was at the gates. In
fact, this situation precipitated one of the most momentous events in
Western history, the sack of Rome in a.d. 410 by an army of Gothic merce-
naries led by Alaric.
Contrary to popular perceptions, the Goths were not invaders from
beyond the imperial frontier. Instead, they were hirelings charged with
defending that frontier. Alaric, a devout Christian and formerly a loyal
Roman general, marched on Rome because he felt that he and his troops
were undercompensated for their frequent, loyal, and effective service to the
empire (Norwich 1988). The problem the Romans faced in the Wfth cen-
tury is a fundamental characteristic of contracts between states and private
military forces. Those being protected must somehow force those who have
ostensibly agreed to provide the protection to post some type of bond that
would be forfeit on failure to honor the terms of the protection contract. 
However, monitoring the terms of such a contract was costly and collect-
ing the bond in the case of nonfeasance, or worse, could be prohibitive.
Consider the situation in which mercenaries, such as Alaric, or privateers
refused to honor their contracts. Mercenary forces in the Weld or privateers
at sea might systematically shirk their responsiblility by avoiding conXict,
but they could still demand pay for services rendered. Who was to force
them to honor the contract? The army? Any state that possessed an army
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whose threat was credible in this situation would not have to rely on mer-
cenaries in the Wrst place. 
This was exactly the situation Rome faced in the Wfth century. Thus every
state faced a situation in which there was some optimal mix of mercenary
and “regular” forces, but, as the Romans learned, in a pinch that mix must
be such that the regulars could impose their will on the irregulars.
Such situations were not quite so acute with naval forces. For one thing,
there were few states of any signiWcance that could be conquered solely
by a naval force. Privateers were in fact occasionally required to post bonds
to guard against misfeasance and malfeasance. During the American Revo-
lution, the Continental Congress required bonds of from $5,000 to $10,000
for its privateers (Paullin 1906). In addition, the fundamental problem was
partly alleviated in privateering by awarding compensation based on per-
formance; this was in the form of “share contracts.” Of course compensat-
ing seamen with a share of the wealth they captured was essentially the same
practice used by pirates since time immemorial. This share contract policy
with privateers provided the crew and ofWcers a portion of all prizes that
were seized and successfully liquidated through prize courts. The tradition
of sharing prizes with ofWcers and crews of ships of war survived the creation
of modern navies. As noted, letters of marque and reprisal gave privateers
the right to arm private vessels and interdict ships of war or merchantmen
of belligerent states or neutral merchantmen hauling contraband. 
While some countries, including the United States and Great Britain,
maintained prize systems for their land forces; these were typically even
more cumbersome and inefWcient than the naval system (Longford 1969,
67). Because of these shortcomings, the share of army compensation de-
rived from the prize system was miniscule compared to that of the navy
(Oliver 1946). A similar, though not quite as formal contract was structured
for mercenaries. Dating from antiquity, it was customary in both Western
and Islamic civilizations that any town or city that unsuccessfully resisted a
siege was subjected to three days of pillage and rape (Norwich 1988, 1996). 
The privilege of sacking a town was denied occasionally in hopes of
maintaining military order among the troops, but woe to the general who
consistently tried to prevent his forces from what they perceived as the
just fruits of their labors. During this period, conscripts were often permit-
ted to supplement their pay through looting and plundering conquered
regions. Napoleon, addressing the Army of Italy, stated, “Soldiers! You
are hungry and naked. The Government owes us much but can give us
nothing . . . I will lead you into the most fertile plains on earth. Rich prov-
inces, wealthy all will be yours for the taking.” He went on to promise his
troops full rations, loot, and glory. At this time the regular pay for French
army personnel was hardly sufWcient to keep one alive, and the spoils stolen
after a victory were used to supplement regular compensation (Schom
1997, 42). Thus, the right to seize goods from conquered cities was used as
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a performance bonus and the lure of loot was used to provide the army with
an incentive to Wght and win, just as a share of the prize induced seamen to
board and seize enemy ships.
While regular troops resorted to looting for their compensation, merce-
nary troops were paid a premium to secure certain military objectives and
maintain some semblance of order. An example of this was the British sack
of Seringapatam in 1799. A young colonel, Arthur Wellesley, the future
duke of Wellington, led a force of Swiss, German, and Indian mercenaries
to protect the palace of Tippoo, the residence of the sultan of Mysore, from
the rampaging British troops. Supposedly, the British commanders were
intent on protecting the palace so that the ofWcers could systematically
loot it after the city was secured. Wellesley alone netted £4,000 ($20,000)
from Seringapatam (Longford 1969, 67). Although land forces have con-
tinued to supplement their earnings by pillaging, the sack as a formal
means of compensation was generally abandoned by Western powers with
the rise of the nation-state and the establishment of professional armies.6
Given this history of rewarding soldiers and seamen with the spoils of vic-
tory, it is worth asking, with respect to their pension plans, why modern
navies adopted a form of compensation associated with privateers while
armies came to rely exclusively on tax revenues to compensate their troops.
The answer lies in the different costs of monitoring the performances of
the two groups. An army unit, mercenary or otherwise, typically works in
close association with other army units and its effectiveness is relatively easy
to monitor. For example, positions on the battleWeld are either taken or
successfully defended or they are not. In either case, although the circum-
stances might be multifarious, the outcome is fairly unambiguous. 
In the age of sail, however, relatively small naval units, often a single ship,
typically worked in isolation, often for long periods, having little contact or
communication with either other units at sea or the admiralty. As a conse-
quence, directly monitoring their performance could be quite costly, even
if it were possible. Indeed, among the primary tasks of navies in the age of
sail were blockade enforcement and commerce raiding. These activities
required attacking merchantmen of belligerent states and neutrals carrying
contraband. Both actions could be hazardous and either could be avoided
quite easily. If a ship’s company went to sea with none of its compensation
tied to performance, it would have been relatively easy to shirk these pri-
mary duties. Guaranteeing that the crew received some portion of the prizes
they captured provided clear performance incentives. Every blockade-
runner not overtaken was compensation forgone by the ship’s crew.
The discussion of the share component in navy compensation suggests
that it was generally successful in making the navy more efWcient. EfWciency
in this context means more output for a particular quantity of inputs, such
as ships and men. However, a more efWcient contract doesn’t necessarily
mean an optimal contract. There might still be room for improvement,
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because it is possible that the share component induced seamen to spend
too much time pursuing prizes and too little time engaging the enemy’s
ships of the line. Napoleon certainly thought this was the case. He con-
stantly complained that, while his navy was all too happy to attack commer-
cial vessels, when it came to ships of war,
the admirals see double and picked up the notion, I know not where, that one can
make war without taking risks. . . . Time and again, at the Conseil d’Etat, I would
reproach them with taking unfair advantage of that circumstance. According to them,
one has to be born in the navy to understand anything about it. (Herold 1955)
There were of course ways of altering the contract to encourage the pur-
suit of ships of war rather than those of commerce. Both the British and
U.S. navies paid what was variously called “head” or “gun” money for the
capture of men and guns aboard a ship of the line. The importance of these
additional incentives was well recognized by policymakers. In the famous
case of the U.S.S. Constitution, Congress awarded the ofWcers and crew
$50,000 for their victory over H.M.S. Guerrière in 1812 (Miller 1997, 65–66).
The British ship was damaged beyond repair and was set aWre at sea. In the
absence of prize money, the payment provided an incentive for other naval
captains. In addition to shirking by raiding commercial shipping rather
than engaging the enemy, there was also the moral hazard associated with
capturing questionable prizes. The naval authorities recognized this possi-
bility, hence privateers were typically required to post a bond before receiv-
ing their letter of marque.
The actual compensation from capturing prizes depended on a number
of variables. Liquidating prizes was a byzantine process by any standard.
The actual amount that ultimately was paid to seaman depended on the
type of prize, the laws of his country pertaining to prizes in general, and
a seaman’s share. In particular, the value of a share was affected by the
interpretation of national laws as well as the “law of the sea” in the prize
court to which the prizes were taken. The venality of the prize agents and
the relationship between the prize courts and any courts of appeal that
might ultimately overturn the prize courts’ decisions also played a signi-
Wcant role in the ultimate determination of prize money.7 Still, the prize
was a fundamental component of naval compensation into the twentieth
century, and it funded navy pensions in the United States from the outset.
Concluding Observations
For centuries, nations have used military pensions to reward soldiers
and seamen for long and faithful service, to provide them with perfor-
mance incentives, and to keep them from forming coalitions to overthrow
the government. This chapter has shown how retirement plans evolved from
Roman times, through the feudal era, and into the modern national states
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of Europe. The American colonies and then the new republic of the United
States provided disability and retirement pensions to militia, soldiers, sea-
men, and privateers. These plans were precursors of the more formal
national pensions established for the army and navy around 1800. The long
history of military pensions is a reminder that employer pensions are not
a new form of compensation. The evolution of military pensions in Western
Europe provides an interesting framework for beginning an analysis of the
development of public pensions in the United States. The formation of the
U.S. navy pension and its unique experiences in the nineteenth century is
the initial focus of this examination. 
This history of the early pension plans of western civilization illustrates
how they often depended on obtaining and retaining the favor of Caesar or
his subsequent counterpart. Such favor might depend on performance on
the job and continued loyalty in retirement. The concept of vesting was
generally unknown. Some of these plans began as disability plans and grad-
ually became retirement plans as old age and inability to perform one’s
duties emerged as a form of disability.
Prior to 1800, pension plans were typically Wnanced by general revenues
of the state or the king’s own purse. Dedicated funding sources were rarely
used, and there were few examples of funds being established to provide an
ongoing source of monies. The generosity of pension plans varied greatly
over time, across countries, and for workers of different ranks within a
country. Special plans for those of high rank provided a high level of retire-
ment income, while most plans for the rank and Wle provided only a mea-
ger standard of existence. Interestingly, many of these pension plans spe-
ciWed the retirement beneWt as a percent of pay similar to contemporary
plans. Today, highly compensated executives often are covered by special,
nonqualiWed retirement plans 
Despite these differences, it seems clear that pre-1800 government lead-
ers understood the importance of pension plans as a component of their
human resource management policies. These early plans were structured to
attract, retain, and motivate employees. They were used in conjunction with
mandatory retirement policies to induce or require workers to retire with-
out forcing older persons into destitution. This history also indicates that
military pensions have been a signiWcant employee beneWt for centuries.
While the funding and vesting standards used to Wnance these pensions
were primitive, the pre-1800 military pensions were important precursors
of nineteenth-century military plans in the United States, and we now turn
to that history. 
Notes
1. A concise, though controversial, economic interpretation of feudalism can be
found in North (1981).
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2. Some of the material on early English and Colonial pensions is based on the
primary sources and references in an unpublished manuscript of the Congressional
Research Service made available to us by Robert Goldich.
3. Charles VI was the last Habsburg ruler of Spain. (In that capacity, he was
referred to, somewhat confusingly, as Carlos III.) The Spanish Crown passed from
the House of Habsburg to that of Bourbon with the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), which
ended the War of the Spanish Succession.
4. The authors thank Professor Thomas Grennes for pointing out this important
historical precedent.
5. For a summary of Elizabethan privateering, see Andrews (1964). For a more
comprehensive, though eclectic, history of privateering, see the papers in Starkey,
Heslinga, and de Moors (1997).
6. The end of the sack as a means of compensating ground troops was not the
result of humanitarian considerations; rather it was linked to the development of
the cannon. Artillery made folly of hiding behind a town’s medieval fortiWcations
and fundamentally altered the course of land warfare (Keegan 1993).
7. For an example of how complicated that process could be in practice, see Pope
(1981) and Paullin (1906).
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